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Information Based Regulation and International Trade 
in Genetically Modified Agricultural Products: An 
Evaluation of The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety  
Michael P. Healy∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article considers the regulation of international trade in 
genetically modified agricultural products. Specifically, it addresses 
both products released into the environment as seeds and products 
intended for consumption as food. The first part of the Article 
describes the significance of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 
in modern agriculture, especially agriculture in the United States.1 
This discussion summarizes the risks and potential benefits 
associated with the use of agricultural GMOs, especially the risks and 
benefits related to biodiversity. The Article then briefly describes the 
approaches to the regulation of these products adopted in the 
Cartagena Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(Protocol).2 The Protocol basically pursues two different regulatory 
 
 ∗ Dorothy Salmon Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. J.D. 
1984, University of Pennsylvania; B.A. 1978, Williams College. This Article was prepared for 
the 2002 National Association of Environmental Law Societies’ (NAELS) Conference: 
“Sustainable Agriculture: Food for the Future” held at Washington University School of Law in 
St. Louis on March 15-17, 2002. The author thanks his colleagues, Kathryn Moore and John 
Rogers, for discussing several of the issues addressed in the Article, and thanks to Mr. George 
Van Cleve for discussing the risks to human health posed by genetically modified food 
products. The author is responsible for any errors.  
 1. See infra Part I. 
 2. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 4, Jan. 
29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027 (2000), available at http://www.biodiv.org/convention/articles. 
asp?lg=0&a=cbd-04.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2002) [hereinafter Protocol]. Part II infra 
discusses the Protocol’s requirements. Eleven nations have ratified the Protocol. See 
http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/signinglist.asp?order=date (last visited Jan. 29, 2002). Article 
37 provides that “[t]his Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of 
deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by States or 
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approaches. The Protocol adopts a regime of Advanced Informed 
Agreement (AIA) for the transboundary import of genetically 
modified food products released into the environment. Genetically 
modified agricultural products intended for consumption as food are 
subject to a more ambiguous regulatory scheme, which includes a 
labeling requirement for product shipments.  
The next two parts of the Article consider these different 
regulatory approaches in greater detail. The Article criticizes the 
details of each of the Protocol’s two regulatory regimes. One fault is 
that the Protocol does not help allocate the burden of proof with 
respect to the importing nation’s decision to accept genetically 
modified products’ introduction into the environment.3 The Protocol 
is incoherent in two respects regarding the regime for the import of 
genetically modified food products. First, when an importing nation 
accepts genetically modified products that pose risks to biological 
diversity, including human health, the Protocol should require a label 
that identifies the product as genetically modified.4 Second, the 
Protocol is flawed because it requires labels for shipments of 
genetically modified food products even if they pose no identifiable 
risk to consumers.5 Generally, however, the Protocol’s regime should 
be lauded because it may provide consumers with the information 
they need to make informed decisions about the foods they consume. 
I. BIOTECHNOLOGY, BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, AND THE CARTAGENA 
PROTOCOL 
Article 2 of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity broadly 
defines “biotechnology” as “any technological application that uses 
biological systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make 
or modify products or processes for specific use.”6 Biotechnology is 
 
regional economic integration organizations that are Parties to the Convention.” 39 I.L.M. 1027, 
1042 (2000). 
 3. See infra Part III. 
 4. See infra Part IV. 
 5. See infra Part IV. 
 6. 31 I.L.M. 818, 823 (1992) (entered into force on Dec. 29, 1993). The United States 
signed the treaty on June 4, 1993, but has not ratified the treaty. See Parties to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity/Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, available at http://www.biodiv.org/ 
world/parties.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 2002). 
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an increasingly important issue in international relations,7 and it plays 
an especially important role in modern agriculture.8 Two specific 
examples of biotechnology’s impact on agriculture are “roundup 
ready” soybeans and “Bt” corn. The genetic material of these plants 
is engineered in the first case to survive the application of a 
herbicide,9 and in the second to kill insects eating the plant.10 There 
are numerous other examples of such crops.11 
The significance of biotechnology for modern agriculture can be 
assessed from several perspectives. Although specific estimates vary, 
an inescapable conclusion is that modern agricultural production 
yields very substantial and growing amounts of GMOs.12 Production 
 
 7. See Stephen McCaffrey, Biotechnology: Some Issues of General International Law, 
14 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 91, 92 (2001). “[T]he rules of international law must be applied to many 
different forms of genetically-engineered products: from pharmaceuticals made from samples 
taken in developing countries, to GM food, crops, and seeds.” Id. 
 8. See Gareth W. Schweizer, Note, The Negotiation of the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety, 6 ENVTL. LAW. 577, 594 (2000). “Food commodities make up the largest group of 
[GMOs] . . . .” Id. (footnote omitted).  
 9. Id. at 581. “Roundup-Ready crops are genetically engineered to resist glyphosate, a 
common herbicide, so that only the crop will survive after spraying.” Id. (footnote omitted).  
 10. Id. “‘[B]t,’ or Bacillis Thuringiensis, is a bacteria that is toxic to insects. In [Bt corn], 
the Bt toxin is incorporated into the DNA of every cell of a plant so that insects die if they eat 
the plant.” Id. (footnotes omitted).  
 11. McCaffrey, supra note 7, at 93. “Since 1992, dozens of [these crops] have been 
approved for sale to American farmers and hundreds more are in the pipeline, with genes 
borrowed from every form of life: bacterial, viral, insect, even animal.” Id. (internal quotations 
and footnote omitted); see also Marc Victor, Precaution or Protectionism? The Precautionary 
Principle, Genetically Modified Organisms, and Allowing Unfounded Fear to Undermine Free 
Trade, 14 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 295, 296 (2001). “The U.S. Department of Agriculture has 
approved fifty plant varieties, termed Genetically-modified Organisms (GMO), for use within 
the United States. In contrast, the EU has only approved eighteen GMOs.” Id. (footnote 
omitted). 
 12. See McCaffrey, supra note 7, at 94. “Farmers have embraced [genetically-modified] 
products to the extent that biotech seeds are used in plants that produced twenty to forty-five 
percent of the corn, soybean, and cotton produced in the United States in 1999 (although the 
experience with StarLink corn has had a chilling effect on the use of GM seeds).” Id. (footnotes 
omitted); see also Victor, supra note 11, at 296 (stating “[n]early half of the soybeans and a 
third of the corn grown in the United States is [sic] genetically altered”) (footnote omitted); 
Mary Lynne Kupchella, Note, Agricultural Biotechnology: Why it Can Save the Environment 
and Developing Nations, but May Never Get a Chance, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 721, 724 (2001) (stating “[i]n 1998, genetically engineered crops accounted for 25% of 
corn acreage planted in the United States, 38% of soy bean acreage, and 45% of cotton acreage, 
for a total of 45 million acres, an increase of 250% from 1997. In 1999, biotechnology plantings 
in the U.S. increased to 62 million acres . . . .”) (footnotes and internal quotations omitted). 
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of roundup ready soybeans13 and Bt corn14 contribute to the striking 
growth in production. This growth in production is matched by a 
growth in the level of consumption of genetically engineered food 
products.15  
Not surprisingly, the economic stakes associated with 
opportunities for unrestricted trade in genetically modified 
agricultural products are already high and are steadily increasing.16 
Countries that have an economic interest in trading these products, 
most especially the United States,17 have promoted their interests in 
unimpeded trade.18 Moreover, this interest in the rules of trade for 
 
 13. See Schweizer, supra note 8, at 581 n.22. “Roundup-Ready soybeans were planted on 
over half of the United States’s soy acres last year.” Id. (citation omitted).  
 14. Id. at 582 n.29. “Bt corn was approved for sale in 1996. In 1997, about 5 percent of 
the nation’s corn crop was Bt corn. By 1999, more than one-third of U.S. corn acres were Bt 
corn.” Id. (citations omitted).  
 15. See McCaffrey, supra note 7, at 94. “Most Americans have probably eaten some food 
made with genetically-modified soy or corn.” Id. (internal quotations and footnote omitted); see 
also Henrique Freire de Oliveira Souza, Genetically Modified Plants: A Need for International 
Regulation, 6 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 129, 131 (2000). Also note that “60% to 70% of 
foods sold in the U.S.A contain substances developed through genetic engineering.” Id. 
(footnote omitted). “Nowadays about 2.5 billion people have been eating GMP directly or 
indirectly, knowingly or not.” Id. at 140-41. “[A]ccording to Mothers for Natural Law] 60 to 70 
percent of foods on U.S. grocery store shelves contain genetically engineered substances.” Id. at 
141 (footnote and internal quotation omitted). 
 16. See Victor, supra note 11, at 309. “In 1998, the United States lost $200 million in corn 
sales alone because of delays in the EU’s approval process for GMOs.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
See also de Oliveira Souza, supra note 15, at 140-41 (stating “[e]ach day more countries are 
allowing cultivation of GMP, in a market that will reach US$ 500 billions/year in the next few 
years”) (footnote omitted); McCaffrey supra note 7, at 94 (stating “[s]eed and chemical 
companies stand to make huge profits from these new products”). 
 17. Kupchella, supra note 12, at 732. “Of the thirty-five million hectares planted in 1998 
of genetically-modified crops, eighty-eight percent were planted in North America, and less 
than one percent was planted in Europe.” Id. (footnote omitted); see also de Oliveira Souza, 
supra note 15, at 141. “[A]ccording to Charles Margulis, a genetic engineering campaigner for 
Greenpeace, it is estimated that 75 percent of all bio-engineered crops are grown in the U.S 
. . . .” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 18. In the negotiation of the Protocol 
[t]he Miami Group represented nations most opposed to efforts to control [GMOs] and 
claimed to harbor an overall concern for harmonizing environmental protection with 
sustainable growth of agricultural economies. These industrialized countries stood to 
suffer the most economic loss by regulations imposed on [GMOs], and they feared that 
elaborate paperwork needed to enforce such controls on commodities . . . would create 
insuperable obstacles for international trade, given the huge number of transboundary 
movements each year. 
Schweizer, supra note 8, at 587 (footnotes and internal quotations omitted). 
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genetically engineered agricultural products has implications for 
trade in all agricultural products.19 
Commentators who laud the “immense” benefits of biotechnology 
welcome figures that demonstrate the growing significance of 
biotechnology in modern agriculture.20 Those promoting the 
agricultural applications of biotechnology cite several benefits. First, 
genetically modified crops may reduce the need for, and application 
of, such agricultural toxins as herbicides21 or insecticides.22 Second, 
genetically modified crops may provide higher yields of crops and 
thereby reduce demand for land dedicated to agricultural use.23 
 
 19. Schweizer, supra note 8, at 592 (footnotes omitted):  
For example, in the United States, the largest producer of bioengineered crops, mixes 
grains that have been genetically modified with unadulterated grains distributed in 
commerce. An AIA applicable to all GMOs could severely harm the American grain 
trade because it would impact almost all grain exported from the United States. 
 20. Kupchella, supra note 12, at 722. “While there are potential risks to agricultural 
biotechnology, and the long-term effects are unknown, the benefits of this technology are 
immense.” Id. (footnote omitted). “Agricultural biotechnology has the potential to solve many 
of the most daunting environmental problems facing the world, such as a decrease in 
biodiversity and shortages of food. With proper regulation, biotechnology can save biodiversity 
and solve numerous other environmental concerns.” Id. at 721 (footnotes omitted); see also 
Richard M. Saines, Rotterdam Treaty on PIC and Biosafety Protocol: Examples of Increased 
Transparency, Technology Sharing, and Accountability in International Law, 24 Int’l Env’t 
Rep. (BNA) 623, 626 (2001). “Proponents of biotechnology see the genetic modification of 
organisms as a powerful tool in the global battle against hunger and poverty, as well as a means 
to improve the environment by reducing the need for pesticides and other chemicals to produce 
food.” Id. 
 21. Kupchella, supra note 12, at 724-25. “The use of herbicide-resistant crops will likely 
cause a reduction in the quantities of herbicides used. . . . Proponents of resistant crops also 
believe that they will allow older, more toxic and generally more harmful herbicides to be 
replaced with ones which are more environmentally favorable.” Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 22. Schweizer, supra note 8, at 581. “[Bt] crops will require fewer insecticide 
applications.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
 23. Id. “Cultivating Bt crops in place of non-GMOs can stimulate higher yields from the 
same plot of land . . . In 1998, 4 billion more pounds of field corn were produced because of Bt 
technology than would have been available without such technology.” Id. (footnote and internal 
quotations omitted); see also Kupchella, supra note 12, at 727-28.  
Higher-yielding crops are yet another way in which biotechnology will aid agricultural 
output. . . . If higher-yielding crops are not used, wild lands will have to be used for 
agriculture. On the other hand, if the same product can be produced with less 
cultivated land, then more land can be returned to a natural habitat. Genetically-
modified crops will also result in land that needs less tilling, benefiting the 
environment through decreased erosion and soil infertility. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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Lastly, genetically modified crops may provide food products with an 
enhanced nutritional value and thereby alleviate the scale of human 
malnutrition.24 
The important role that biotechnology plays in modern agriculture 
has grown rapidly despite the risks that genetic modification poses 
for the environment and human health. The greatest concern about 
the genetic modification of plants is the threat to biological 
diversity.25 
The use of genetically modified agricultural products is 
understood to pose two general threats to biodiversity. First is “[t]he 
risk that altered DNA will contaminate an ecosystem,” referred to as 
“genetic pollution.”26 Such pollution was recently identified in 
Mexico, where “DNA from genetically modified corn has found its 
way into native corn varieties growing in remote southern Mexico, 
heightening fears about the dangers of bioengineered crops.”27 
Apparently, the polluting DNA came from consumable modified corn 
 
 24. See Kupchella, supra note 12, at 726. “Biotechnology will also be able to solve 
nutritional deficiencies in developing nations. Approximately 400 million women suffer from 
iron deficiency in third-world nations where the staple diet is rice. A new variety of rice 
containing iron and vitamin A will be able to decrease this number.” Id. (footnotes omitted); see 
also de Oliveira Souza, supra note 15, at 138. 
The main benefits of biotechnology can be summarized in the following way: (a) it 
contributes to the human food supply and to the protection of biodiversity, allowing a 
more efficient use of land, and a more productive harvest; (b) it improves the quality 
of food; (c) it may contribute to reducing the use of agrochemicals and pesticide; and 
finally (d) it may be helpful for the maintenance of germplasm collections. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 25. Jim Chen, Diversity and Deadlock: Transcending Conventional Wisdom on the 
Relationship Between Biological Diversity and Intellectual Property, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,625, 
10,627 (2001) (footnotes omitted). Professor Chen has argued forcefully that 
[b]iodiversity preservation is arguably humanity’s greatest challenge. It certainly 
qualifies if the relevant gauge is the duration and difficulty of corrective measures. 
According to the geological record of previous extinction spasms, the “full recovery of 
biodiversity” after a catastrophe such as a meteor strike “require[s] between 10 and 
100 million years.” By this measure, “the loss of genetic and species diversity by the 
destruction of natural habitats” is probably the contemporary crisis “our descendants 
[will] most regret” and “are least likely to forgive.”  
Id. 
 26. See Schweizer, supra note 8, at 583 (footnote omitted). 
 27. Alex Dominguez, Scientists Find Genetically-Modified Corn DNA has Spread to 
Mexican Maize, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 29, 2001, at 1 (copy on file with author). 
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used as seed.28 The effects of genetic pollution are difficult to predict 
and are likely to vary,29 but could potentially include super insects30 
and super weeds.31  
Related to the phenomenon of genetic pollution is the threat that 
“the use of GMOs may also cause the loss of diversity in a gene pool, 
a process also known as ‘genetic erosion.’”32 Such erosion may occur 
as the ecosystem changes in response to its newly modified 
organisms.33 Moreover, biotechnology may have more direct, though 
unintended, consequences for species in the affected ecosystem.34 
 
 28. Id. “Researchers suspect imported genetically-modified corn was handed out by a 
government agency as food and may have been planted by recipients near their traditional 
crops.” Id. 
 29. See Kupchella, supra note 12, at 728, 729 (footnotes omitted): 
Yet unknown is what types of interactions genetically-modified plants will have with 
other species. There is a fear that genetically altered organisms will become 
agricultural pests or colonize natural ecosystems, disturbing balances, especially where 
characteristics would allow it to compete successfully. It is possible that these new 
organisms will hybridize with a related wild species thereby producing hybrid progeny 
that are harder to control. Even plants which are unlikely to escape into the wild can 
potentially change populations of microorganisms in the soil and the types and 
numbers of insects and other animals in surrounding areas. 
 30. Schweizer, supra note 8, at 582. “Regular exposure to Bts can result in insects 
developing a resistance to the toxin, thus becoming ‘super-insects.’” Id.; see also de Oliveira 
Souza, supra note 15, at 139. “[W]hile crops may be engineered to contain natural insecticides, 
insects can adapt, becoming resistant much more quickly than expected.” Id. (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 31. See Schwiezer, supra note 8, at 581. “The main risk surrounding Roundup-Ready 
crops is that if bees or wind transfer the pollen from these crops to wild plants, weeds can also 
develop resistance to herbicides.” Id. (footnote omitted). de Oliveira Souza elaborates further 
about these risks. 
[T]he first risks are indicated by FAO in the following way ‘The inclusion of novel 
genes for herbicide resistance in plants may increase the occurrence of weeds with 
resistance to certain agrochemicals, the [FAO] reported warned. The inclusion of pest 
resistance in plants should be carefully evaluated for potential development of 
resistance in pests and possible side-effects on beneficial organisms. 
de Oliveira Souza, supra note 15, at 138-39 (footnotes omitted). 
 32. Schweizer, supra note 8, at 583. 
 33. de Oliveira Souza, supra note 15, at 139 (internal quotations and footnote omitted):  
The introduction of any new organism into an ecosystem might affect the dynamics of 
the ecosystem or the gene pool of wild relatives. These effects can happen whether the 
new organism is a new crop variety or a new microorganism introduced for disease 
control, and whether it is genetically-engineered, bred by traditional means, or simply 
from a different ecosystem. 
 34. Schweizer, supra note 8, at 582. “[Bt crops] can kill beneficial insects, such as bees 
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Choices by farmers may increasingly limit the range of plants grown 
for agricultural purposes.35 This latter effect may yield adverse 
economic, as well as environmental, effects.36 Genetic pollution and 
genetic erosion are present in certain geographic areas located in less-
developed nations that have richly diverse ecosystems which are 
untested in terms of the impacts on biodiversity.37 
When compared to the risks that agricultural biotechnology poses 
to the environment, the risks posed to human health so far appear 
more limited. Genetic engineering poses risks related to human 
allergies.38 Significant uncertainty prevails in this area, because 
 
and ladybugs, when they eat the engineered crop.” Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 35. de Oliveira Souza, supra note 15, at 139. “[A]nother risk is the loss of diversity 
provoked by the widespread use of one—or a few—species of crops.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
Cf. John Ntambirweki, Biotechnology and International Law Within the North-South Context, 
14 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 103, 104 (2001). Uganda has traditionally grown more than thirty 
species of bananas, but today “[t]he plant breeders have now come in with their few varieties. 
Everybody is rushing for the new bigger banana bunches which fetch more in the market. The 
diversity that was conserved by farmers for millennia is being steadily lost.” Id. 
 36. de Oliveira Souza, supra note 15, at 138 (citation, footnote, and internal quotations 
omitted): 
[S]mall farmers fear that a small number of large corporations will be able to corner 
the market on genetically engineered animals, thereby depriving the small family 
farms of their livelihood. Additionally, the farmers are concerned that the initial 
acquisition price of genetically altered animals, and the subsequent royalties, will 
increase rather than decrease the costs for farmers and consumers. 
 37. See Schweizer, supra note 8, at 584  (footnotes omitted):  
Although industrialized countries have tested the environmental impact of GMOs on 
their own land, testing in these countries may not necessarily prove that GMOs are 
safe in a different ecological setting. As a result of these unknown risks, environmental 
activists have petitioned for a global ban on GMOs until the long-term safety of their 
use is better understood. 
Cf. id. at 583 (footnote omitted): 
Exposing crops to the wild genes preserved in centers of origin, natural areas where 
wild relatives of cultivated crops grow, helps to restore vigor to a crop. If GMOs were 
mistakenly released in a center of origin, the genetic make-up of the gene pool could 
become permanently altered. 
 38. See Committee on Genetically Modified Pest-Protected Plants, National Research 
Council, Genetically Modified Pest-Protected Plants: Science and Regulation (2000) 
[hereinafter NRC Report], which reported that: 
The potential risks of transgenic pest-protected plants to human health are generally 
related to the possibility of introducing new allergens or toxins into food-plant 
varieties, the possibility of introducing new allergens into pollen, or the possibility that 
previously unknown protein combinations now being produced in food plants will 
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allergenicity risks are extremely difficult to assess39 and testing for 
human health effects has been sporadic and inconsistent.40 Moreover, 
incidents of serious risks to human health arising from adaptations to 
the genetic material of traditional food products41 give rise to 
concerns that engineered changes in plant genes may cause other, 
similar risks to human health.42 Interestingly, the Protocol itself 
defines the scope of the agreement by reference to “adverse effects on 
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking 
also into account risks to human health.”43 The Protocol thereby 
makes protection of human health subsidiary to the protection of 
biological diversity. 
II. THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL REQUIREMENTS 
This Article will now describe the regulatory approach to 
genetically modified agricultural products defined by the Protocol.44 
Congress adopted the Protocol “[o]n 29 January 2000, after some five 
years of difficult negotiations.”45 In the view of one observer, 
negotiations reflected the policy concerns of environmental, rather 
than agricultural, ministries46 and made evident that “the underlying 
 
have unforeseen secondary or pleiotropic effects. . . .  
Id. at 62-63; de Oliveira Souza, supra note 15, at 139. “The main risk to health is allergy, and 
one example is found in the allergic side effects provoked by the addition of Brazil nut protein 
in a soybean.” Id. (footnote omitted); see also Kupchella, supra note 12, at 730. “One of the 
strongest arguments for the regulation of transgenic food concerns the spread of allergenicity 
throughout the food supply.” Id. 
 39. See NRC Report, supra note 38, at 66 (“Allergenicity is difficult to test, in part 
because prior exposure is a prerequisite to an allergic reaction.”); see also id. at 68-69 
(discussing difficulty of testing because of dietary limits and limited time). 
 40. See id. at 63 (describing limited “detailed assessments of safety for humans or 
domestic animals”). 
 41. See id. at 70-71 (describing human health risks resulting from conventionally-bred 
varieties of potatoes and celery). 
 42. See id. at 66 (referring to the human health risk posed by genetic engineering of 
soybeans). See generally George Van Cleve, Regulating Environmental and Safety Hazards of 
Agricultural Biotechnology For A Sustainable World, 9 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 245 (2002). 
 43. Protocol, supra note 2, at Art. 4. 
 44. 39 I.L.M. 1027 (2000). 
 45. Peter-Tobias Stoll, Controlling the Risks of Genetically-Modified Organisms: The 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the SPS Agreement, 10 Y.B. OF INT’L ENVTL. L. 82, 82 
(1999); see id. at 86-87 (summarizing interests represented in the negotiations).  
 46. See Thomas Jacob, The Cartagena Protocol: A First Step to a Global Biosafety 
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notion that most of the countries brought to the table was that 
genetically modified organisms [] are inherently dangerous.”47 
In considering the structure of the regulatory scheme adopted in 
the Protocol, the parties notably refrained from using the more 
common term, GMO, and instead substituted the apparently more 
restrictive term, “living-modified organism” (LMO). An LMO is 
defined as “any living organism that possesses a novel combination 
of genetic material obtained through the use of modern 
biotechnology.”48 The regulatory scheme then establishes 
 
Structure?, 14 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 79, 81 (2001):  
By and large, most of the countries came to the table with their environment 
ministries, leaving their agricultural ministries at home. Lacking was the kind of 
interdisciplinary and/or interagency process that the United States and a number of 
other countries use in negotiation of these types of international agreements ensuring 
that all the interests of a particular country and society are integrated. The fact that 
most countries did not involve their agricultural ministries is also important because 
much of the Protocol is focused on agricultural applications. The individuals in those 
ministries have the expertise regarding application of the existing international 
agriculture and food safety instruments. On the other hand, among the environment 
ministry participants, in some cases there was very little involvement and awareness of 
those existing instruments. 
Mr. Jacob works for DuPont, which has a significant interest in the profitability of 
biotechnology. Id. at 80. The regulatory concerns of the negotiators of the Protocol contrast 
with the regulatory concerns of the agency primarily responsible for regulation of genetically-
modified agricultural products within the United States. 
The [New York] Times report notes that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
is “the primary agency responsible for assuring the ecological safety of [genetically 
modified] plants,” and points out that the USDA “has not rejected a single application 
for a genetically engineered crop.” Some scientists criticize these approvals on the 
ground that the Agency often relies on claims and studies conducted by the seed 
companies themselves. 
 According to the report, USDA has set no scientific standards for evaluating the 
environmental safety of a genetically engineered plant. The Times further states that 
rather than demanding specific experiments and data to establish safety, as is the case 
in other fields, the USDA “asks only that petitioners explain why the new plant is 
unlikely or likely to pose a number of broadly defined risks.” But USDA officials 
defend their decisions, even while they “acknowledge that their system for weighing 
applications is evolving.” 
McCaffrey, supra note 7, at 93 (footnotes and emphasis omitted). 
 47. Jacob, supra note 46, at 81. 
 48. See Protocol, supra note 2, at Art. 3(g). One commentator described the negotiation of 
this particular term. 
One of the important roles of the Protocol was to set forth various generally acceptable 
definitions for many important terms, allowing for consistency in use. Since the 
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requirements for the transboundary shipment of LMOs for use in 
agricultural products and other requirements for shipments of LMOs 
intended for use in animal feed or for human consumption.49 A 
summary of these differing regulatory approaches follows.  
Articles 8, 9, 10, and 12 of the Protocol define the AIA procedure 
that applies “prior to the first intentional transboundary movement of 
living modified organisms for intentional introduction into the 
environment of the Party of import.”50 The Protocol’s AIA procedure 
“does not make any groundbreaking innovations. It simply expands 
upon the elements contained in Article 19 of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity [(CBD)]. It gives flesh to the concept of 
‘advance informed agreement’ provided for in the CBD.”51 The 
Protocol provides that the exporting party must notify the importing 
party of the intended transboundary introduction of an LMO into the 
importing country.52 The importing party must acknowledge the 
notice,53 then decide whether to consent to the import.54 The 
importing party has an obligation to provide reasons to the exporting 
party any time that unconditional consent is not given.55 The standard 
the importing party must apply when deciding whether to consent to 
 
Protocol was intended to be a legally binding international instrument, a lot of time 
went into these definitions—almost a year was spent trying to define with precision 
exactly what is covered under the term “living modified organism.” It was decided that 
the generic term “genetically-modified organism” would not be used since the 
negotiators felt a more scientifically precise definition was needed. 
Jacob, supra note 46, at 83. 
 49. See Protocol, supra note 2, at Art. 7. The terms of the Protocol also define three 
important limits on its scope. First, “Protocol shall not apply to the transboundary movement of 
living modified organisms which are pharmaceuticals for humans that are addressed by other 
relevant international agreements or organizations [sic].” Id. at Art. 5. Second, “the provisions 
of this Protocol with respect to the advance informed agreement procedure shall not apply to 
living modified organisms in transit.” Id. at Art. 6(1). Third, “the provisions of this Protocol 
with respect to the advance informed agreement procedure shall not apply to the transboundary 
movement of living modified organisms destined for contained use undertaken in accordance 
with the standards of the Party of import.” Id. at Art. 6(2). 
 50. Id. at Art. 7(1). 
 51. Ntambirweki, supra note 35, at 125; see also McCaffrey, supra note 7, at 96. “The 
AIA procedure under the Protocol is generally congruent with PIC under other agreements, but 
contains more specific and detailed time periods for decision-making.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
 52. See Protocol, supra note 2, at Art. 8(1). 
 53. See id. at Art. 9. 
 54. See id. at Art. 10. 
 55. See id. at Art. 10(4). 
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import is ambiguous under the Protocol. The Protocol provides that a 
party may decline to consent to import, notwithstanding a “lack of 
scientific certainty.”56 
Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant 
scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of 
the potential adverse effects of a living modified organism on 
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in 
the Party of import, taking also into account risks to human 
health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a decision, as 
appropriate, with regard to the import of the living modified 
organism in question . . . in order to avoid or minimize such 
potential adverse effects.57 
The Protocol also includes, however, two provisions that may 
limit the ability of the importing party to refuse consent to 
importation of the LMO. First, Article 15 provides that the risk 
assessment, used as the basis for the consent decision, “shall be 
carried out in a scientifically sound manner, in accordance with 
Annex III and taking into account recognized risk assessment 
techniques.”58 This requirement of a scientifically sound risk 
assessment may place the burden on the importing country to present 
evidence of risk in order to refuse consent.59 Second, the preamble to 
the Protocol “[e]mphasiz[es] that this Protocol shall not be 
interpreted as implying a change in the rights and obligations of a 
Party under any existing international agreements.”60 This language 
appears to subject the Protocol to the constraints imposed on the 
regulation of international trade by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), including the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Standards.61 The apparent clarity of this preamble language is, 
however, muddied by the next clause of the Protocol’s preamble, 
 
 56. See id. at Art. 10(6). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. at Art. 15(1).  
 59. See Schweizer, supra note 8, at 599. “By including an AIA, the Protocol gives 
countries the power to refuse to import a genetically modified crop. . . . [C]ountries must base 
any rejection of GMOs on scientific findings, and not on unfounded fears.” Id. (footnotes 
omitted). 
 60. Protocol, supra note 2, at Preamble (emphasis added). 
 
 61. See infra Part III. 
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which states the “[u]nderstanding that the above recital is not 
intended to subordinate this Protocol to other international 
agreements.”62 The juxtaposition of the two clauses in the preamble is 
as striking as it is confusing.63 
Article 8 of the Protocol defines the procedures that apply to the 
transboundary movement of a LMO “for direct use as food or feed, or 
for processing.”64 These products are not subject to the AIA 
requirement.65 Instead, the Protocol provides vaguely that “[a] Party 
may take a decision on the import of living modified organisms 
intended for direct use as food or feed, or for processing, under its 
domestic regulatory framework that is consistent with the objective 
of this Protocol.”66 Article 11 requires parties to provide information 
about their decisions on the import of LMOs to the Biosafety 
Clearinghouse, established under Article 20 of the Protocol.67 Indeed, 
this reporting requirement broadly applies to the reporting of any 
“final decision regarding domestic use, including placing on the 
market, of a LMO that may be subject to transboundary movement 
for direct use as food or feed, or for processing.”68 
 
 62. Protocol, supra note 2, at Preamble (emphasis added). 
 63. One commentator has written that the language of the preamble “is supremely 
ambiguous.” Jacob, supra note 46, at 86. 
 64. Protocol, supra note 2, at Art. 8. 
 65. For a description of the Protocol’s approach to controlling the movement of LMOs, 
see McCaffrey, supra note 7, at 95.  
Not only is the Protocol limited in scope to LMOs, its basic approach to controlling the 
transboundary movement of those organisms—the “advanced informed agreement” 
(AIA) procedure . . . —does not apply to agricultural commodities. Thus, genetically 
engineered food, perhaps the chief concern of the public, is not subject to an AIA 
requirement.” 
Id.; see also Jacob, supra note 46, at 84. “Excepted from the application of the advanced 
informed agreement (AIA) process were ‘living modified organisms intended for direct uses as 
food feed or for processing’—in essence, the commodity movement of grains and such.” Id. 
(footnotes omitted). 
 66. Protocol, supra note 2, at Art. 11(4). The Protocol also provides special rules 
regarding this decision-making for “[a] developing country Party or a Party with an economy in 
transition.” Id. at 11(6). If such a nation lacks the requisite domestic regulatory framework, it is 
authorized to “declare through the Biosafety Clearing-House that its decision prior to the first 
import of a living modified organism intended for direct use as food or feed, or for processing, 
on which information has been provided . . ., will be taken” based on a risk assessment 
conforming to the Protocol’s requirements and completed within 270 days. See id.  
 67. See id. at Art. 11(1). 
 68. Id. 
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The Protocol also includes a requirement unrelated to the 
importing nation’s approval of the modified food products. 
Genetically modified food products must bear labels “clearly 
identifying that they ‘may contain’ living modified organisms and are 
not intended for intentional introduction into the environment, as well 
as a contact point for further information.”69 This labeling 
requirement,70 watered down by its very terms, was opposed by the 
major industrialized exporters of agricultural products.  
While [major industrialized exporters] succeeded in preventing 
the Protocol from imposing strict regulations on commodities 
exports, the adopted Protocol does contain a provision 
requiring exporters to label any shipments that may include 
genetically altered substances with the phrase “May contain 
living modified organisms.” As a result, importers have the 
option to label any products as such, and consumers will be 
able to decide whether or not they want to purchase products 
that may be genetically altered.71 
These requirements fully define the Protocol’s regulatory scheme 
for the transmission and disclosure of information among the 
importing and exporting parties, as well as purchasers. Parties to the 
Protocol will address additional rules of liability and redress, with a 
goal of four years set by the Protocol.72 
It is important to now turn to an assessment of the Protocol’s 
regulatory regime, first with respect to the AIA procedure and then 
with respect to the labeling requirement. 
 
 69. Id. at Art. 18(2). 
 70. See Saines, supra note 20, at 627. “Article 18 of the [P]rotocol requires LMOs to be 
clearly labeled, including separate labeling requirements for LMOs intended for direct use as 
food or feed or for processing.” Id. For a discussion of the significance of this labeling 
requirement, see infra Part IV.  
 71. Schweizer, supra note 8, at 600 (footnotes omitted). The Protocol provides that 
“detailed requirements for th[e] purpose” of labeling LMO food products are to be defined 
within two years. Protocol, supra note 2, at Art. 18(2)(a). The work began at a June 2001 
meeting of technical experts. See Saines, supra note 20, at 627. 
 72. See Protocol, supra note 2, at Art. 27; see also McCaffrey, supra note 7, at 95. The 
Protocol “postpones entirely the question of liability for harm resulting from the transboundary 
movement of LMOs.” Id. (footnote omitted).  
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III. RISK ASSESSMENT AND A PARTY’S AIA  
A basic understanding of the treatment of risk assessments in state 
decisions to limit international trade is important to an evaluation of 
the AIA procedure established by the Protocol and an understanding 
of whether the Protocol seeks to reshape international trade law. 
International agreements define the current risk assessment and trade 
regulation regime and provide for the WTO.73 One such agreement is 
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS Agreement).74 The SPS Agreement’s definition of a 
“[s]anitary or phytosanitary measure” would clearly include an 
importing nation’s decision to exclude LMO’s based on the risk 
posed to biodiversity or to require product labeling.75 If the measure 
conforms to the requirements of the SPS Agreement, then the 
 
 73. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final 
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (Apr. 
15, 1994) [hereinafter GATT]. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994). 
 74. The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
Apr. 15, 1994, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/sps-e/spsagr_e.htm (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2002) [hereinafter SPS Agreement]. 
 75. The SPS Agreement provides that such a measure is 
[a]ny measure applied:  
 (a) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member from 
risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-
carrying organisms or disease-causing organisms;  
 (b) to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member from 
risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in 
foods, beverages or feedstuffs;  
 (c) to protect human life or health within the territory of the Member from risks 
arising from diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry, 
establishment or spread of pests; or  
 (d) to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member from the 
entry, establishment or spread of pests. Sanitary or phytosanitary measures include all 
relevant laws, decrees, regulations, requirements and procedures including, inter alia, 
end product criteria; processes and production methods; testing, inspection, 
certification and approval procedures; quarantine treatments including relevant 
requirements associated with the transport of animals or plants, or with the materials 
necessary for their survival during transport; provisions on relevant statistical methods, 
sampling procedures and methods of risk assessment; and packaging and labelling 
requirements directly related to food safety. 
 
SPS Agreement, supra note 74, at Annex A: Definitions (1). 
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measure presumptively conforms to the 1994 General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).76 
The SPS Agreement requires first that members base any sanitary 
or phytosanitary measure on a risk assessment.77 The SPS Agreement 
requires, moreover, that “each Member shall avoid arbitrary or 
unjustifiable distinctions in the levels [of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection] it considers to be appropriate in different situations, if 
such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
international trade.”78 
The WTO dispute resolution framework has resolved disputes 
over the requirements established by the SPS Agreement. The WTO 
Appellate Body has, in particular, given content to the requirement 
that nations impose protective measures only on the basis of a 
sufficient risk assessment.  
A risk assessment within the meaning of Article 5.1 must 
 (1) identify the diseases whose entry, establishment or 
spread a Member wants to prevent within its territory, as well 
as the potential biological and economic consequences 
associated with the entry, establishment or spread of these 
diseases;  
 
 76. Id. at Art. 2(4). “Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to the relevant 
provisions of this Agreement shall be presumed to be in accordance with the obligations of the 
Members under the provisions of GATT 1994 which relate to the use of sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures, in particular the provisions of Article XX(b).” Id. 
 77. See id. at Art. 5(1). “[M]embers shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures are based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to 
human, animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed 
by the relevant international organizations.” Id. The SPS Agreement defines a “[r]isk 
assessment” as  
[t]he evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease 
within the territory of an importing Member according to the sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures which might be applied, and of the associated potential biological and 
economic consequences; or the evaluation of the potential for adverse effects on 
human or animal health arising from the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins or 
disease-causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs. 
Id. at Annex A: Definitions (4). 
 78. Id. at Art. 5(5). 
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 (2) evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread 
of these diseases, as well as the associated potential biological 
and economic consequences; and 
 (3) evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread 
of these diseases according to the SPS measures which might 
be applied.79 
These components of the risk assessment mean that 
[i]t is not sufficient that a risk assessment conclude that there is 
a possibility of entry, establishment or spread of diseases and 
associated biological and economic consequences. A proper 
risk assessment of this type must evaluate the “likelihood”, i.e., 
the “probability”, of entry, establishment or spread of diseases 
and associated biological and economic consequences as well 
as the “likelihood”, i.e., “probability”, of entry, establishment 
or spread of diseases according to the SPS measures which 
might be applied.80 
Evaluation of the “likelihood” need not be quantitative, and the 
SPS Agreement does not mandate a threshold level of risk. “The 
likelihood may be expressed either quantitatively or qualitatively. 
Furthermore, . . . there is no requirement for a risk assessment to 
establish a certain magnitude or threshold level of degree of risk.”81 
 
 79. Australia—Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WTO Appellate Body, 
WT/DS18/AB/R, ¶ 121 (Oct. 20, 1998) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter Australia-Measures]. 
 80. Id. ¶ 123; see de Oliveira Souza, supra note 15, at 169-70 (footnotes omitted): 
When adopting measures related to technical barriers to trade (e.g., basic standards and 
labels) the evaluation of the risks justifying the measure must be done based on 
“available scientific and technical information, related processing technology or 
intended end-uses of products.” Scientific evidence as such has played an essential role 
in the adoption of restrictive measures. 
The range of acceptable scientific evidence in defining risk is broad. See Victor, supra note 11, 
at 312 (footnotes omitted): 
A member country need not rely on ‘mainstream’ scientific opinion to establish 
sufficient scientific evidence as required by the SPS Agreement, but can rely upon 
what may be a divergent opinion coming from qualified and respected sources. A 
panel is given a great deal of discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient 
scientific evidence. 
 81. See Australia-Measures, supra note 79, at ¶ 124 (footnotes omitted). The Appellate 
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Finally, the SPS agreement requires an independent evaluation of risk 
with regard to the effects of the sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures.82 
SPS measures that have the effect of limiting international trade 
must meet a threshold determination that a risk actually exists and 
that the measures will actually reduce that risk. This requirement 
should preclude a nation from employing SPS measures for the 
purpose of limiting imports.83 Moreover, the SPS Agreement requires 
that SPS measures be applied in a nondiscriminatory manner.84 The 
 
Body provided additional elaboration when it stated that “the ‘risk’ evaluated in a risk 
assessment must be an ascertainable risk; theoretical uncertainty is ‘not the kind of risk which, 
under Article 5.1, is to be assessed.’ This does not mean, however, that a Member cannot 
determine its own appropriate level of protection to be ‘zero risk’.” Id. ¶ 125 (footnote omitted). 
See Victor, supra note 11, at 311-12: 
The Appellate Body’s reading of the SPS Agreement gives a member state a much 
broader ability to raise its standards above the level set by international standards, as 
long as it possesses sufficient scientific evidence. This more generous authority to 
raise standards is subject to review by dispute settlement panels and is limited by the 
requirement that a “rational substantive relationship exist between the risk assessment 
and the measure adopted.” 
See also Jacob, supra note 46, at 89. “[E]xisting international law allows a country to take 
action based on any scientific indication of a potential risk, even if there are significant 
uncertainties associated with it.” Id. 
 82. See Australia-Measures, supra note 79, at ¶ 134. 
 83. See Victor, supra note 11, at 307 (footnotes omitted): 
The establishment of the [SPS Agreement] allows WTO members to impose stronger 
measures, but only when there is sufficient “scientific justification” to support a 
member’s determination that there is a need for stricter standards. This requirement is 
intended to prevent agricultural protectionism by a WTO member who may be seeking 
to evade its free trade commitments to other member countries. The existence of a 
verifiable standard removes the ability of a member country to inhibit free trade by a 
mere assertion unsupported by science. 
 84. See SPS Agreement, supra note 74, at Art. 5(5). The nondiscrimination principle 
would, for example, bar a nation from adopting SPS measures that accept higher levels of risk 
from domestic products than from similar imported products. See Christopher D. Stone, Is 
There a Precautionary Principle?, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,790, 10,799 (2001). The SPS 
Agreement: 
suggests a compromising tactic: a member invoking distinctive national risk concerns 
as a basis for refusal to import a potentially hazardous agent is allowed leeway in the 
level of border protection it selects, as long as it applies nondiscriminatorily 
comparable levels of risk protection across the board, including domestically. 
Id. (footnote omitted). For a description of the course of events in Europe, compare Victor, 
supra note 11, at 304. 
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regime thus ensures that trade limiting SPS measures are grounded in 
articulable safety concerns and are not motivated by protectionism.85  
The AIA procedure adopted in the Protocol appears consistent 
with the requirements of the SPS Agreement. A state’s decision to 
limit the import of LMO’s must be based on a risk assessment but 
may be made notwithstanding uncertain evidence of risk.86 
Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant 
scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of 
the potential adverse effects of a living modified organism on 
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in 
the Party of import, taking also into account risks to human 
health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a decision, as 
appropriate, with regard to the import of the living modified 
organism in question as referred to in paragraph 3 above, in 
order to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects.87 
 
On June 25, 1999, the Council recommended that Directive 90/220 be amended to 
adopt a precautionary approach that prevents the authorization of a GMO until there is 
positive proof that it does not affect human health or the environment. All the member 
states of the EU agreed to follow this approach. Despite the member states’ assertion 
that they would enforce the moratorium, seven member states have simultaneously 
proposed eleven new GMO products for authorization. As a result of the inconsistency 
in enforcement of GMO regulation between the national governments and the 
supranational EU government, people have no reliable information on whether these 
governmental bodies are protecting consumers or industry; thus the European public 
has little confidence in regulatory authorities.  
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 85. The requirements defined by the SPS Agreement are analagous to the rules governing 
trade within the European Communities. In Commission of the European Communities v. 
French Republic, the European Court held that France was not permitted to ban the sale of 
British beef because of a concern about the risks of bovine spongiform encephalopathy that was 
not supported by adequate scientific evidence. Comm’n of the European Cmtys. v. French 
Republic, Case C-100 (Dec. 13, 2001), available at http://europa.eu.int (last visited Feb. 11, 
2002). The requirements of the SPS Agreement also appear analogous to the requirement of 
domestic law that a government not base its decision-making on irrational fears. See City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); see also Dean Milk Co. v. City of 
Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78 (1891) (holding that dormant 
commerce clause prevents local limits on trade that are unrelated to health or environmental 
risks). 
 86. Protocol, supra note 2, at Art. 10(6). 
 87. Id. This provision applies to LMOs intended to be introduced into the environment of 
the Party of import. Id. at Art. 7(1). Identical language is included in the requirements for 
decision-making regarding LMOs intended for direct use as food or feed or for processing. Id. 
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This language seems consistent with the application of the 
precautionary principle that now undergirds much of international, as 
well as domestic, environmental law.88 Nevertheless, the Protocol’s 
language has been criticized on the ground that it demands too much 
scientific evidence of risk before a State may bar the import of 
LMOs. Professor McCaffrey has written that 
[t]he risk management provisions authorize precautionary 
action only if the scientific uncertainty concerns the “extent” 
of the potential adverse effects of LMOs. Unless interpreted 
otherwise by the parties, this requirement would significantly 
narrow the effectiveness of the provisions on precaution. As 
one commentator has observed, “[I]n the case of the risks 
associated with LMOs, it is uncertain[ty] regarding the if and 
how, rather than the extent, of the risk, that is likely to be 
primarily at stake.”89 
This concern grows when the final version of the Protocol is 
contrasted with an earlier draft, which appears to limit the nature of 
the required scientific evidence.90 
 
at Art. 11(8). 
 88. See Michael P. Healy, England’s Contaminated Land Act of 1995: Perspectives on 
America’s Approach to Hazardous Substance Cleanups And Evolving Principles of 
International Law, 13 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 289, 291-92 (1997-98) (describing 
precautionary principle). One commentator has argued that the Protocol’s adoption of the 
principle is especially emphatic. See Stoll, supra note 45, at 97:  
[T]he Biosafety Protocol, unlike the Basel and PIC Conventions, not only places the 
precautionary principle in prominent positions in its preamble and objectives 
provisions (Article 1) but also builds it directly into the operative provisions on risk 
assessment. The recognition and legal expression of the precautionary principle as 
highlighted in these provisions can be considered an important and genuine 
achievement. 
 89. McCaffrey, supra note 7, at 98 (footnote omitted); see also Jacob, supra note 46, at 
87. “What [the Protocol] says regarding the extent of potential adverse effects is important. By 
implication, this suggests that we have some scientific information to indicate that there is an 
adverse effect. Frankly, this suggestion is very much in dispute right now with respect to 
LMOs, particularly in certain applications.” Id.; see also Stoll, supra note 45, at 116 (according 
to the Protocol, “precautionary action will only be authorized if the lack of certainty concerns 
the ‘extent’ of the adverse effect. The provision thereby implies that all other aspects and 
especially the source or origin of the adverse effect have to be certain.”).  
 90. Jacob, supra note 46, at 88: 
The version that appeared in the Pre-Montreal draft text (Article 8.7) read, “[l]ack of 
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To the extent, however, that a threshold requirement under the 
WTO regime already compels some evidence of risk before a trade 
restriction may be imposed,91 the final Protocol language is less 
controversial. There will necessarily be an extent of the risk issue, 
rather than an existence of the risk issue, regarding the basis for a 
permissible trade restricting decision. For this reason, a different 
issue regarding the effect of the Protocol seems more significant. 
How does the agreement address the insufficiency of information for 
the risk management determination? Indeed, commentators have 
urged that the question of which party bears the burden of adducing 
scientific evidence relating to the risks of LMOs is critical.92 
With respect to this issue, the Protocol can be read to allocate the 
burden of coming forward with scientific evidence of safety to the 
exporting nation based on the preference of the importing nation. 
Although the Protocol does not include express language authorizing 
trade restrictions when scientific evidence is not available,93 several 
 
full scientific certainty or scientific consensus regarding the potential adverse effects 
of a living modified organism shall not prevent the Party of import from prohibiting 
the import of the living modified organism in question.” This was somewhat more 
direct. The difference in the final result is going to invite challenge and confusion and 
we would have preferred not to see that difference. 
 91. For a description of this requirement of the SPS Agreement, see supra notes 79-80 
and accompanying text. 
 92. See McCaffrey, supra note 7, at 98 (footnote omitted): 
[T]he big question in terms of trade in GMOs is who should bear the burden—i.e., the 
burden of showing whether the GMO in question is dangerous to human health or the 
environment. Specifically, should the country exporting GMOs have to establish that 
they are safe or at least that they do not pose unacceptable dangers? Or must the 
importing country do so before it will be allowed to keep them out? It may be very 
difficult to carry this burden because the precise risks posed by most GMOs are not 
fully understood. Allocation of the burden may therefore determine whether the GM 
goods move across borders or not. 
 See also de Oliveira Souza, supra note 15, at 173: 
[T]he precautionary principle and the principle of ‘scientific evidence’ would be 
compatible if the burden of proof shifted. Thus, the new legislation in terms of GMP 
simply should (a) first, allow any country to take a restrictive measure (label, ban or 
moratorium, or minimal standard) based on the precautionary principle, and (b) 
second, allow any country suffering the economic consequences of this measure to 
challenge the same, and this country would be responsible for proving scientifically 
that the GMP is absolutely safe to the environment and to human beings, so the change 
would mean only a shift in the burden of proof. 
 
 93. Other international agreements do include explicit provisions allowing regulatory 
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provisions relating to the risk assessment support this reading. First, 
the Protocol states that the “[l]ack of scientific knowledge or 
scientific consensus should not necessarily be interpreted as 
indicating a particular level of risk, an absence of risk, or an 
acceptable risk.”94 Such a gap in information is accordingly 
consistent with any of those conclusions. The Protocol also 
recognizes that a need for additional information may become 
 
controls in such circumstances. Article 715(4) of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
provides that: 
where a Party conducting a risk assessment determines that available relevant 
scientific evidence or other information is insufficient to complete the assessment, it 
may adopt a provisional sanitary or phytosanitary measure on the basis of available 
relevant information, including from international or North American standardizing 
organizations and from sanitary or phytosanitary measures of other Parties. The Party 
shall, within a reasonable period after information sufficient to complete the 
assessment is presented to it, complete its assessment, review and where appropriate, 
revise the provisional measure in the light of the assessment. 
32 I.L.M. 289, 379 (1993); see also Robert Housman, The North American Free Trade 
Agreement’s Lessons for Reconciling Trade and the Environment, 30 STAN. J. INT’L L. 379, 
405 (1994) (footnotes omitted), who has written that: 
NAFTA also break[s] new ground for the formation of trade policy by explicitly 
recognizing the precautionary principle of environmental law. [Its provisions] allow 
the NAFTA parties leeway to adopt environmental, health and safety measures where 
the scientific evidence is insufficient to determine the actual risk posed by a given 
product or service. Whereas the other NAFTA standards provisions, discussed above, 
provide leeway for environmental protections where the science is conflicting, these 
precautionary provisions provide leeway where the science is incomplete. 
Moreover, Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement includes a similar provision regarding insufficient 
information: 
 In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may 
provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available 
pertinent information, including that from the relevant international organizations as 
well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by other Members. In such 
circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a 
more objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure 
accordingly within a reasonable period of time. 
SPS Agreement, supra note 74, at Art. 5.7. In Japan, the Appellate Body concluded that Japan 
failed to comply with the provisional measures provision because “Japan did not seek to obtain 
the additional information necessary for a more objective risk assessment,” and “Japan has not 
reviewed its varietal testing requirement ‘within a reasonable period of time.’” Measures 
Affecting Agricultural Products, World Trade Organization Appellate Body, WT/DS76/AB/R 
¶¶ 92, 93 (Feb. 22, 1999). 
 94. 39 I.L.M. 1027, 1045 (2000). 
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apparent in the consideration of a risk assessment.95 It also grants the 
importing nation authority to request the submission of such 
information.96 Moreover, the Protocol recognizes an important 
context for additional information, because it realizes the significance 
of release of LMOs into an environment in which release had not 
previously occurred.97 Finally, the Protocol recognizes the ability of 
the importing nation to seek additional information in a case of 
“uncertainty regarding the level of risk” as an alternative to a 
decision to permit the import of the LMO with a monitoring 
requirement.98 
Interpreting the Protocol to permit an importing nation to allocate 
the burden of adducing scientific evidence to support the release of 
LMOs to the exporting nation offers several important benefits. First, 
this allocation creates a strong incentive for the development of 
relevant scientific evidence,99 especially in the United States. Under 
domestic law, the procedures mandated by the National 
Environmental Policy Act for government actions that significantly 
affect the environment help develop information important to public 
policy making.100 In a far different context, the formal method of 
 
 95. Id. “The process of risk assessment may . . . give rise to a need for further information 
about specific subjects, which may be identified and requested during the assessment process 
. . . .” Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1046 (requiring that risk assessment include “[i]nformation on the location, 
geographical, climatic and ecological characteristics, including relevant information on 
biological diversity and centres of origin of the likely potential receiving environment”). 
 98. Id. “Where there is uncertainty regarding the level of risk, it may be addressed by 
requesting further information on the specific issues of concern or by implementing appropriate 
risk management strategies and/or monitoring the living modified organism in the receiving 
environment.” Id. 
 99. The clearinghouse mechanism established by the Protocol should further these values 
as well. See Protocol, supra note 2, at Art. 20. 
 100. See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, in which the court concluded that the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) violated the National Environmental Policy Act when it 
approved the first experimental release of a genetically modified organism into the 
environment. 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The court concluded that the 
NIH must first complete a far more adequate environmental assessment of the possible 
environmental impact of the deliberate release experiment than it has yet undertaken. 
That assessment must “provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining 
whether to prepare an environmental impact statement or a finding of no significant 
impact,” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(1). Ignoring possible environmental consequences will 
not suffice. Nor will a mere conclusory statement that the number of recombinant-
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p205 Healy book page.doc  12/18/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
228 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 9:205 
 
interpreting statutes is defended in part because it induces the 
disclosure of information.101 Creating new incentives for the 
development of information about LMOs is important because the 
United States, as the principal exporter of LMOs, is not obligated by 
domestic law to develop such information.102  
 
DNA-containing organisms will be small and subject to processes limiting survival. 
Instead, NIH must attempt to evaluate seriously the risk that emigration of such 
organisms from the test site will create ecological disruption. Second, until NIH 
completes such an evaluation the question whether the experiment requires an EIS 
remains open. The University of California experiment clearly presents the possibility 
of a problem identified by NIH in its EIS as a potential environmental hazard. This 
fact weighs heavily in support of the view that an EIS should be completed, unless 
NIH can demonstrate either that the experiment does not pose the previously identified 
danger, or that its assessment of the previously identified danger has changed through 
a process of reasoned decision-making. Nor is it sufficient for the agency merely to 
state that the environmental effects are currently unknown. Indeed, one of the specific 
criteria for determining whether an EIS is necessary is “[t]he degree to which the 
possible effects on the human environment as highly uncertain or involve unique or 
unknown risks.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(5). 
756 F.2d at 154-55. 
 101. Professor Sunstein has written that  
[i]t seems most straightforward to defend formalism as a massive or global 
information-eliciting default rule. Perhaps formalism is likely to produce greater 
clarity from Congress, precisely because it ensures that statutory language will be 
understood by reference to its terms. Thus the notion that statutes will be taken in their 
“plain meaning” might be understood as a way of encouraging Congress to speak 
unambiguously.  
Cass R. Sunstein, Formalism and Statutory Interpretation: Must Formalism Be Defended 
Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 655 (1999). 
 102. See Victor, supra note 11, at 304. “The United States has no major laws regulating 
GMOs.” Id. (footnote omitted); see also McCaffrey, supra note 7, at 93. “[I]t does not appear 
that the agencies [with regulatory authority relevant to GMOs] have yet succeeded in 
coordinating their activities in this area, so that what regulation there is of genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) is far from seamless.” Id.  
[A]s concerns the United States, based on media reports which suggest a rather passive 
attitude on the part of U.S. regulatory agencies, I would have to answer that it does not 
appear that the United States is in fact “tak[ing] all appropriate measures” to prevent or 
minimize the risk of significant transboundary harm from GMOs.  
Id. at 100. 
 Professor McCaffrey provides the following example of the very limited regulatory 
requirements in the United States. 
The USDA admitted that its system for evaluating applications for genetically 
engineered plants was still “evolving.” It accepted studies by the proponent of the new 
plant, and those studies are often—even in the most critical cases—sub-par. For 
example, in the crookneck squash case, only fourteen of the weeds related to the 
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The allocation of the burden to produce information permitted by 
the Protocol is also defensible because the Protocol so far lacks a 
liability regime. In a context in which harm may not be remedied if it 
occurs to an importing nation, that nation should have greater 
opportunity to ensure the safety of LMO imports.103 
Finally, the Protocol’s discretionary allocation of the burden to 
produce information responds to the national differences among 
importing states regarding risk concerns.104 A state with greater 
 
proposed squash were actually studied to determine whether its population would be 
kept in check by the virus that the new plant would be immune to—an immunity that 
could spread from the new, supersquash to the weeds, making them superweeds. As 
one scientist observed, the fact that none of the weeds studied had the virus could just 
as well be due to the virus having wiped out all the weeds it had encountered. If so, the 
spread of the immunity from the new squash to the weedy cousin would be a real 
problem. In fact, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) found that the USDA did 
not have an adequate scientific basis for its approval of the squash. In what some 
would consider to be an understatement, one member of the NAS panel opined that: 
“There needs to be some caution here.” 
Id. at 98 (footnotes omitted); cf. GAO, Environmental Information: EPA Is Taking Steps to 
Improve Information Management, but Challenges Remain, at 5 (Sept. 1999 GAO/RCED-99-
261) (describing how EPA regulates despite “extensive data gaps [that] are a result both of a 
lack of fundamental scientific knowledge and of inadequate data collection”). But cf. Kupchella, 
supra note 12, at 730-31. “No statutes exist in the United States that address biotechnology 
specifically. However, there is a very comprehensive process to evaluate genetically modified 
products for risks to human, animal, and plant health and for environmental safety.” Id. 
(footnotes omitted). 
 103. See Stone, supra note 84, at 10,798 (footnotes omitted):  
One can conjure circumstances in which uncompensated risk-shifting could be 
defended. Nonetheless, the presumptions against it find support on grounds both of 
economic efficiency and intuitive fairness. The impact of uncompensated harms can 
and of course should be reduced by fortifying the law’s compensation mechanisms. 
But as long as the prospect of settling up ex post are limited, there is all the more 
warrant to foster precautionary mechanisms ex ante. How far, is hard to say. 
Mechanisms that stifle externalities find favor, as do those that build on information-
forcing and consent. For example, when the risk accompanies a commodity in transit, 
boundary crossing can be conditioned on the risk receiver’s consent, as under the prior 
informed consent provisions of the Basel Convention and Cartagena Protocol. 
 104. Professor Stone has written that: 
There remains, however, a set of cases in which more risk information, alone, will not 
reduce and reconcile conflicting evaluations of the uneliminated risks. In the tumult 
over LGMOs, for example, the opposition arises not merely from diverging 
interpretations of the limited empirical data. Conflicting national and cultural values 
are involved, including control over what we eat, and attitudes toward science, 
sovereignty, and capitalism. And different evaluations—different risk targets, with 
differing willingness to “take the risk”—can arise out of differences in wealth. As one 
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concerns should have the ability to withhold a final decision until 
information about risks and benefits is available. Of course, a state 
that is risk averse and requires more information must apply that 
same approach to domestic products under the principle of 
nondiscrimination.  
In sum, the Protocol appears consistent with the regime of 
international trade regulation by requiring that scientific evidence 
show a risk posed by LMOs before an importing nation is authorized 
to bar their import. The Protocol, however, arguably permits the 
importing nation to allocate the burden to demonstrate a lack of risks 
to the exporting nation.105 
 
commentator has said of the Bergen Declaration: “One person’s unacceptable 
consequence’ is another’s regrettable necessity.” 
Stone, supra note 84, at 10,798 (footnotes omitted).  
 Stone also noted that 
sometimes the intuition that we ought to be cautious reflects an awareness that 
different people (and in the international context, nations), react to risks differently. 
Sometimes the risks are objectively different. . . . In other circumstances, variations in 
risk assessment may largely reflect differences in the degree to which the available 
data and recommendations of experts (ordinarily Western) are trusted. 
Id. at 10,798 (emphasis omitted). 
 Commentators have noted the significant differences in the perception of risks associated 
with LMOs in the United States as compared to Europe. See de Oliveira Souza, supra note 15, 
at 142-43 (footnotes omitted): 
In the USA, GMP will be considered safe, unless there is actual proof against this 
assumption, and if the GMP is safe, the food is also safe and there is no need for 
special label indicating that the food originated from GMP. On the other hand, the 
position in EU is that the GMP and its products are considered unsafe, unless there is 
clear proof against this assumption, and if the food is not safe ‘a priori’ the consumer 
must be protected through a special label. 
Cf. Victor, supra note 11, at 309. “In a statement to EU officials last fall, U.S. Commerce 
Undersecretary David Aaron claimed that because the EU did not have the scientific grounds to 
reject products containing GMOs, it had resorted to ‘a variety of ploys and political maneuvers 
to delay and deny’ the product’s approval.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
 105. The consistency of this aspect of the Protocol with the GATT’s regime may depend on 
whether the importing country is seen as having adopted a provisional measure pending the 
receipt of additional information. See supra note 93. One commentator has written that  
a conflict in which the respective parties belong to both instruments will most likely be 
resolved in favor of the Biosafety Protocol, as it is the more specific (lex specialis) and 
the most recent agreement (lex posterior). In the case of a non-party to the protocol, 
the SPS Agreement will prevail. 
Stoll, supra note 45, at 117. 
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IV. INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND INFORMED CONSENT OF 
PRODUCT PURCHASERS 
The Protocol’s regulatory approach to LMOs intended for food, 
feed, or processing differs from the AIA approach that applies to 
LMOs intended for release into the environment. The importing 
country has authority to bar the initial import of genetically modified 
food products106 and there must be “documentation accompanying” 
the LMOs stating that the product “may contain” LMOs.107 By 
imposing this requirement, the Protocol accepts the need for a 
disclosure requirement despite the fact that the importing nation has 
not found a product risk that warrants a prohibition against import. 
This Article considers whether this requirement is consistent with the 
international trade regime and whether the requirement yields 
important policy benefits.  
The Protocol is ambiguous about who will have a chance to 
review the required documentation. Details of the requirement, which 
will be discussed as a “labeling requirement,” are to be identified 
within two years.108 The Article assumes that the purchaser to whom 
the product information is disclosed includes the ultimate 
consumer.109 To the extent only retailers receive the product 
information, the requirement will be seen as more or less defensible 
depending on the nature of the risks of the LMOs. 
In order to evaluate the legality and the advisability of the labeling 
requirement, this Article sets forth three hypothetical contexts in 
which the requirement would apply. First, an importing nation may 
decide that the import of LMO food products results in definite 
articulable risks. The importing nation may nevertheless decide to 
 
 106. See Protocol, supra note 2, at Art. 7(3). 
 107. Id. at Art. 18(2)(a). LMOs that are intended for release into the environment must 
meet more definitive labeling requirements. Such items must be “clearly identifie[d]” as LMOs. 
Id. at Art. 18(2)(c). 
 108. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 109. In describing the implementation of Article 18, the Intergovernmental Committee for 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety has plainly considered the issue of product labeling for use 
by consumers. See Intergovernmental Committee for the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 
Handing, Transport, Packaging and Identification (Article 18), at 8-14 (UNEP/CBD/ICCP/1/6) 
(Sept. 25, 2000) (reviewing international and national requirements relating to labeling of LMO 
food products). 
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permit import of the products because it does not pursue a zero risk 
policy regarding LMOs. Second, the importing nation may be quite 
uncertain about the risks of LMO food products after analyzing the 
risk assessments for the products, which may lack probative scientific 
studies of effects. The importing nation may decide to permit the 
import of the products, notwithstanding its uncertainty about product 
risks. Third, the importing nation may allow import of the LMO 
products based on its conclusions that the risk assessment shows that 
the product does not cause any risks.110 With these different scenarios 
in mind, this Article now considers the legality of the labeling 
requirement. 
Because labeling is a type of SPS measure,111 its consistency with 
the international trade regime is assessed by reference to the 
requirements of the SPS Agreement. As previously discussed,112 that 
agreement imposes two requirements for SPS measures. First, there 
must be a reasonable, articulable risk of harm associated with the fact 
that the food product is genetically modified for the label to be 
acceptable. Second, the importing state has to apply the requirement 
in a nondiscriminatory manner by requiring such labeling of 
genetically modified domestic food products. Under the first 
hypothetical scenario, the importing nation concludes that an 
identifiable risk is present and allows the import nonetheless. As long 
as that nation conforms to the nondiscrimination requirement, its 
labeling requirement is permissible and is less restrictive than a ban 
on importation. Under the second hypothetical scenario, again 
assuming nondiscrimination, the labeling requirement arguably 
conforms to the SPS Agreement. Allowing the import of labeled 
LMO products seems less restrictive than barring import until more 
certain scientific studies are available. In the previous part, the article 
explains how the Protocol arguably permits such an action by the 
 
 110. There are, of course, significant uncertainties relating to the risks of LMOs. The risks 
that the release of LMOs poses to genetically-rich ecosystems may not have been tested. See 
supra note 37. Also, risks to human health posed to human health are quite difficult to identify 
and necessarily uncertain. See supra notes 39-42. This third, zero-risk category may 
accordingly be nonexistent. 
 111. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 112. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. 
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importing nation in conformity with the SPS Agreement.113 Indeed, 
the Protocol’s labeling requirement appears to reflect a generic 
decision by its Parties that the uncertainties associated with LMOs 
establish at least a minimum level of articulable risk. Under the third 
scenario, however, the labeling requirement would undoubtedly 
violate the SPS Agreement. If an importing nation decides that an 
LMO food product poses no articulable risk, a label identifying the 
product as genetically modified would be unwarranted as an SPS 
measure. 
There are also several public policy bases for the labeling 
requirement that merit consideration. By mandating labeling of LMO 
food products, the Protocol imposes an information disclosure 
requirement that is independent of, but has the effect of 
supplementing, the regulatory scheme for consent to importation—a 
type of command and control regulation.114 This supplementary role 
of information disclosure is consistent with the increasingly 
important role of information disclosure in environmental regulation. 
Regarding the import of LMOs, the governmental regulation related 
to permitted imports in the first two hypothetical scenarios does not 
entirely eliminate the risks associated with importation: The decision 
of the importing state in the first two scenarios does not reflect a zero 
risk standard, either because there is an established, known risk 
associated with the LMOs or because the uncertainties of the risk 
mean that use of the product imposes a risk of an uncertain extent on 
consumers. The label in these two circumstances accordingly gives 
individual consumers an opportunity to make their own decisions 
about voluntary exposure to the residual, nonzero product risks. In 
 
 113. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. 
 114. See de Oliveira Souza, supra note 15, at 163-64 (footnotes omitted): 
Labels . . . do not impose any internal requirement on the product. They only impose 
an external requirement in terms of information: some information about the product 
must be attached to the product. So, labeling has three basic functions: (a) it informs 
the consumer that some product is more or less dangerous to the consumer’s health 
(making consumers more aware of the risks of the product), or to the environment 
(e.g., the voluntary European Eco-Label); (b) it protects consumers through a clear and 
honest exposure to the existing risks relating to the product; and (c) it allows 
consumers to make intentional choices, so if a similar product exists (in terms of 
characteristics, performance, taste, price and so on) it will enable the consumer to 
choose among them or opt for a substitute product. 
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the third, very rare circumstance, in which the importing nation 
determines that no articulable risk is present, there is no reason for a 
label since there would be no risk for the consumer to consider. 
In the United States, the government requires regulated entities to 
provide the government with information that will be disclosed to the 
public as an alternative or supplement to traditional command and 
control regulatory requirements. The government first took this 
approach in the required annual Toxics Release Inventory (TRI).115 
Another important example is California’s Proposition 65, which 
requires warnings by companies of exposure to identified toxic 
substances.116 A final example is the federal mandate, included in the 
1996 Amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act,117 that “each 
community water system [] mail to each customer of the system at 
least once annually a report on the level of contaminants in the 
drinking water purveyed by that system.”118 
Among the required contents for these “consumer confidence 
reports” is the following information. 
If any regulated contaminant is detected in the water purveyed 
by the public water system, a statement setting forth (I) the 
maximum contaminant level goal, (II) the maximum 
contaminant level, (III) the level of such contaminant in such 
water system, and (IV) for any regulated contaminant for 
which there has been a violation of the maximum contaminant 
level during the year concerned, the brief statement in plain 
language regarding the health concerns that resulted in 
regulation of such contaminant . . . .119 
All three of these regulatory regimes require companies to report 
releases of, or exposure to, pollutants, regardless of whether the 
release or exposure is permitted under the command and control 
regulations of polluting activities. Other nations have begun to 
 
 115. The reporting requirement is prescribed in 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (Supp. 1999). See 
generally Bradley C. Karkainnen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and 
Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 289 (2001). 
 116. See id. at 345-47.  
 117. Safe Drinking Water Acts Amendments, Pub. L. No. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613 (1996). 
 118. Id. § 114(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 300g-3(c)(4)(A) (2000)). 
 119. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(c)(4)(B). 
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impose similar information disclosure obligations120 and have already 
proposed or adopted labeling requirements for LMO food products.121 
The United States, which arguably began this regulatory approach 
when it imposed the TRI requirement, so far has imposed no such 
labeling requirements for LMOs.122 
An important consequence of this regulatory approach is that the 
required disclosure of information may change the behavior of the 
regulated entity even in the absence of command and control 
regulatory requirements. For example, in the view of many observers, 
the success of the TRI has been great, yielding reductions in reported 
emissions of almost fifty percent that go beyond reductions mandated 
by the EPA’s command and control requirements.123 These beneficial 
environmental results have been accomplished, moreover, at costs to 
the agency and regulated entities that appear to be much lower than 
the administrative and compliance costs associated with command 
and control regulations.124 Similarly, consumer attitudes about the 
safety of GMOs might change if the government required labeling for 
LMO products.125 The reduced level of demand for and production of 
 
 120. See generally Karkainnen, supra note 115, at 347-50. 
 121. See Mike Kepp, Cardoso Inks Brazilian GM Labeling Decree; Green Consumer 
Groups Seek Revocation, 24 Int’l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 661 (2001); Joe Kirwin, EU Proposes 
Strict GMO Labeling Rule; Action Likely to Aggravate U.S. Concerns, 24 Int’l Envtl. Rep. 
(BNA) 639 (2001); Shai Oster, China Issues New Rules to Ensure Safety, Labeling, Licensing 
of GMO Crop Activities, 24 Int’l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 519 (2001). 
 122. See Victor, supra note 11, at 306 (footnotes omitted):  
The FDA only requires labeling of genetically-modified foods if the composition of 
the food differs significantly from the food from which it was derived or if it may pose 
a health threat. The U.S. Congress may consider a bill for the mandatory labeling of 
foods containing GMOs, similar to the EU’s “Novel Food Regulation.” However, the 
U.S. Secretary of Agriculture has stated that federal requirements for labeling are 
unlikely. 
The lack of a labeling requirement does not reflect a lack of consumer interest in such 
information. See de Oliveira Souza, supra note 15, at 144. “[Eighty-five percent] of Americans 
considered the labeling of GMF very important, according to the United States Department of 
Agriculture, and 99% desire a clear identification in the label indicating that the product is a 
GMF.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
 123. See Karkainnen, supra note 115, at 287-88. 
 124. See id. at 291-92. The costs of TRI for reporting entities are hardly trivial, however, as 
can be seen by the EPA’s estimates of the significant costs associated with expanding the scope 
of TRI reporting. See William F. Pedersen, Regulation and Information Disclosure: Parallel 
Universes and Beyond, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 189 (2001).  
 125. A recent poll made the following findings. 
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these products would then presumably last until producers are able to 
demonstrate product safety to consumers.126 In this respect, the 
labeling requirement creates an incentive for interested companies or 
nations to develop information that will convince consumers that 
their products pose no risk.127 If this incentive generates substantial 
new information about the risks associated with LMO food products, 
then that information could lead to a confident determination that 
risks are not posed by the products. In this manner, the labeling 
requirement for the second category of decisions to allow importation 
could come to be inconsistent with the theory of supplementary 
 
Consumers’ attitudes and purchasing behavior would be affected by GE food labels. 
About 30% of consumers stated that GE-labeled foods were “not as safe” as or were 
“worse” than identical foods without such label information. In addition, 40% to 43% 
of those surveyed would buy products labeled “genetically engineered,” while 52% of 
consumers would choose a product labeled “does not contain genetically engineered 
ingredients” over a product labeled that it does “contain” such ingredients. In other 
words, the poll indicates that many consumers would favor non-GE foods because 
straightforward label statements about GE or non-GE implies to them that non-GE 
foods are better and safer than comparable GE foods . . . . 
Center for Science in the Public Interest, National Opinion Poll on Labeling of Genetically 
Engineered Foods 1 (May 15, 2001), available at http://www.cspinet.org/reports/op_poll 
_labeling.html) (last visited Feb. 10, 2002); see also Schweizer, supra note 8, at 582 n.29. 
Consumers have shied away from purchasing these products because of environmental 
and health concerns, making it difficult for farmers to market their genetically altered 
products. As a result, a recent poll of 400 farmers conducted at the annual meeting of 
the American Farm Bureau Federation indicated that there might be a 24 percent 
decline in plantings of Bt corn compared with last year. 
Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also de Oliveira Souza, supra note 15, at 158. 
“[A] recent survey [in Brazil] supported by the newspaper ‘O GLOBO’ concerning GMF 
showed that: 44% believe that GMF is not healthy, 38% had no opinion about the subject, and 
18% considered GMF not harmful to health.” Id. (footnote omitted); see also Victor, supra note 
11, at 296. 
The concomitant effect of a lack of faith in science upon the acceptance of science is 
especially evident in the backlash against genetically altered foods in Europe. In 
reaction to the fear generated by the outbreak of madcow disease in the early 1990s, 
European consumers have a great lack of trust for additives, modern livestock-feeding 
techniques, and biotechnology in general. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 126. Lost sales resulting from consumer preferences are not the only costs of a labeling 
requirement. The labeling requirement could force food suppliers to develop supply methods 
that separate LMO from non-LMO products. See Kupchella, supra note 12, at 736. 
 127. This incentive would reinforce another incentive already created by the AIA 
procedure discussed in supra Part III. 
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information based regulation, as there would not be any residual risk 
for the consumer to consider. 
A second reason to impose the labeling requirement for LMO 
food products is that the Protocol provides for a differential regime 
for individual, as opposed to governmental, decision-making. A 
requirement that LMO food products be labeled, even though the 
importing state decides that they are sufficiently safe to import, 
reflects an important and coherent difference between the quality of 
information required for the government’s food safety determinations 
and the quality of information required for a consumer’s food safety 
decision-making. For example, if domestic policy relating to tobacco 
is coherent, it is because our polity has concluded that the 
government need not ban sales of tobacco because the public is well 
advised of the risks associated with product use, based at least in part 
on product labeling. Adult individuals are given the power and 
responsibility to choose whether to expose themselves to the 
product’s risks. Government can reduce the need for paternalistic 
regulations by requiring disclosure of product risks and by allowing 
individuals to decide for themselves whether risks are too high. This 
approach may also result in more rational government decision-
making about risk prevention.128  
The extent to which this rationale supports the Protocol’s labeling 
requirement is less certain than the first rationale. With respect to 
both the first and second hypothetical scenarios, a risk is either 
known to be present or is presumptively present due to uncertain 
scientific evidence. To allow individual decision-making in these 
contexts would be consistent with the reason for the differential 
regime for decision-making. The Protocol requirement is, however, 
flawed with respect to this rationale. To the extent that the LMO food 
product does impose risks, the Protocol’s watered down label 
requirement, the “may contain” language, impedes the individual’s 
ability to make an informed choice about purchasing the product.  
 
 128. If a state opts for the zero risk approach, then the issue of risk based labeling does not 
arise because the products may not be imported. This has occurred under the European 
regulatory regime. That regime provides for labeling of genetically modified products, but such 
products have not been approved for sale because of safety concerns. See Kupchella, supra note 
12, at 732-33.  
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p205 Healy book page.doc  12/18/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
238 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 9:205 
 
Moreover, a paradox emerges regarding LMOs. The risks that are 
likely to motivate the consumer’s decisions about risk exposure, such 
as risks to the health of the consumer and the consumer’s family, may 
not be the risks that the products pose from the perspective of the 
importing nation, such as risks to biodiversity.129 Moreover, the 
significant ecosystem risks that LMOs may pose arise principally in 
the nation in which the LMO food products were grown, rather than 
in the importing nation.130 This latter point may not foreclose a nation 
from imposing SPS requirements,131 but consumers are unlikely to 
 
 129. The risks associated with LMOs are described in supra Part I. 
 130. But cf. supra note 22 and accompanying text (describing situation in Mexico, in which 
native corn may have been contaminated by LMOs distributed as food products). 
 131. In United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO 
Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), the Appellate Body discussed whether 
GATT permitted a nation to adopt trade restrictions based on impacts on “exhaustible 
resources,” endangered sea turtles in that case, located outside of the importing nation’s 
jurisdiction. Its conclusion in that case did not definitively resolve the issue. 
The sea turtle species here at stake . . . are all known to occur in waters over which the 
United States exercises jurisdiction. Of course, it is not claimed that all populations of 
these species migrate to, or traverse, at one time or another, waters subject to United 
States jurisdiction. Neither the appellate nor any of the appellees claims any rights of 
exclusive ownership over the sea turtles, at least not while they are swimming freely in 
their natural habitat—the oceans. We do not pass upon the question of whether there is 
an implied jurisdictional limitation in Article XX(g), and if so, the nature or extent of 
that limitation. We note only that in the specific circumstances of the case before us, 
there is a sufficient nexus between the migratory and endangered marine populations 
involved and the United States for purposes of Article XX(g). 
Id. ¶ 133 (footnote omitted). 
 An earlier GATT Panel, applying the terms of GATT 1947, considered inter alia, the 
permissibility of a “Dolphin Safe” label requirement based on the tuna fishing practices of the 
exporting nation. See Report of the GATT Panel, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna 
DS21/R-39S/155 (Sept. 3, 1991):  
 5.42 The Panel proceeded to examine the subsidiary argument by Mexico that the 
labelling provisions of the [Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act (DPCIA)] 
were inconsistent with Article I:1 because they discriminated against Mexico as a 
country fishing in the [Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP)]. The Panel noted that the 
labelling provisions of the DPCIA do not restrict the sale of tuna products; tuna 
products can be sold freely both with and without the “Dolphin Safe” label. Nor do 
these provisions establish requirements that have to be met in order to obtain an 
advantage from the government. Any advantage which might possibly result from 
access to this label depends on the free choice by consumers to give preference to tuna 
carrying the “Dolphin Safe” label. The labelling provisions therefore did not make the 
right to sell tuna or tuna products, nor the access to a government-conferred advantage 
affecting the sale of tuna or tuna products, conditional upon the use of tuna harvesting 
methods. The only issue before the Panel was therefore whether the provisions of the 
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contemplate such risks when making decisions about whether to 
purchase the products. In sum, under the first two scenarios, the 
labeling requirement arguably reflects a proper distinction between 
the consideration of risk at the national and individual levels. The 
requirement would be even more defensible if the public more clearly 
understood the nature of the risks posed by LMOs as food products. 
The watered down label prescribed by the Protocol is, however, 
contrary to the second rationale. 
With respect to the third scenario that requires a label despite a 
decision to allow product imports based on a finding of no risk, the 
rationale of differential regimes for decision-making is inapplicable. 
Once the government has determined that a product poses no risks, it 
is incoherent to require a label that would allow individual decision-
making based on concerns about the product that have no basis in 
 
DPCIA governing the right of access to the label met the requirements of Article I:1. 
 5.43 The Panel noted that the DPCIA is based inter alia on a finding that dolphins 
are frequently killed in the course of tuna-fishing operations in the ETP through the 
use of purse-seine nets intentionally deployed to encircle dolphins. The DPCIA 
therefore accords the right to use the label “Dolphin Safe” for tuna harvested in the 
ETP only if such tuna is accompanied by documentary evidence showing that it was 
not harvested with purse-seine nets intentionally deployed to encircle dolphins. The 
Panel examined whether this requirement applied to tuna from the ETP was consistent 
with Article I:1. According to the information presented to the Panel, the harvesting of 
tuna by intentionally encircling dolphins with purse-seine nets was practised only in 
the ETP because of the particular nature of the association between dolphins and tuna 
observed only in that area. By imposing the requirement to provide evidence that this 
fishing technique had not been used in respect of tuna caught in the ETP the United 
States therefore did not discriminate against countries fishing in this area . . . . The 
labelling regulations governing tuna caught in the ETP thus applied to all countries 
whose vessels fished in this geographical area and thus did not distinguish between 
products originating in Mexico and products originating in other countries. 
The Panel accordingly concluded that the labeling requirement was not barred by GATT. See 
id. ¶ 7.3. 
 It is important to recognize that, as the concerns about the risks inhering in the product 
being labeled become less connected to the jurisdiction of the nation imposing the label 
requirement, the labeling arguably relates solely to the product’s process and production 
methods, rather than risks to the safety of the importing nation. The legality of such eco-
labeling is determined by reference to the GATT’s Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT Agreement). See http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/fina_e.htm (last visited Feb. 
7, 2002) for the text of the TBT Agreement. The issue of the permissibility of such labeling 
under the TBT Agreement is a controversial one. See, e.g., DAVID HUNTER ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1182-84 (2d ed. 2002). That issue is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
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fact.132 A regulatory regime that bars a nation from limiting the 
import of a product that imposes no risks should not require product 
labeling that would allow, if not encourage, product decisions by 
consumers that are irrational given the lack of a showing of product 
risk.133 An analogy to the circumstances of the City of Cleburne134 
case may illustrate this point. There, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that a local government acted unlawfully when its zoning 
discriminated against a group home for the retarded on the basis of 
concerns about the residents of such a home that were shown to have 
no basis in fact.135 In such a circumstance, it would be similarly 
unacceptable to force the home to label itself as a home for the 
retarded with the result that neighborhood residents would act upon 
their baseless concerns about the home’s residents. 
A third and final context for assessing the advisability of the 
labeling requirement is to compare it to another labeling requirement 
that is accepted by the international trade regime. The terms of GATT 
expressly permit country of origin labeling.136 Country of origin 
labeling allows consumers to preferentially select products of 
domestic origin.137 Interestingly, the United States requires country of 
 
 132. Few, if any, LMOs, of course, will fall within this third category. See supra note 110. 
Labeling of zero-risk LMOs may arguably be defended as an indicator of the product’s process 
and production methods. See supra note 131. 
 133. Cf. Center for Science in the Public Interest, supra note 125. “The survey found that 
approximately 40% of consumers believe that GE-related labeling reflects upon the quality and 
safety of the food, even though many scientists and regulatory agencies have found no such 
differences for current products.” Id. “[A] percentage of consumers who think GE foods are the 
same as or better than unlabeled foods still would not buy a labeled GE food.” Id. 
 134. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 135. See id. at 448 (holding “mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors 
which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a 
home for the mentally retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the 
like”). 
 136. GATT, supra note 73, at Art. IX; see also Terence P. Stewart et al., Trade and Cattle: 
How the System Is Failing an Industry in Crisis, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 449, 508 (2000). 
“The [WTO] Technical Committee’s work makes clear . . . that mandatory country of origin 
labeling is consistent with WTO obligations . . .” Id. 
 
 137. It is evident that many consumers consciously prefer to purchase domestic products. 
One recent example was the reaction of consumers to a proposal by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) to change the requirements for the “Made in USA” label. In December 
1997, the FTC published a notice in the Federal Register recounting its “comprehensive review 
of ‘Made in USA’ and other U.S. origin claims in product advertising and labeling.” “Made in 
USA” and Other U.S. Origin Claims, 62 Fed. Reg. 63,756 (Dec. 2, 1997). The FTC had 
historically required “that a product must be wholly domestic or all or virtually all made in the 
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origin labeling for imported products,138 while it does not require 
labeling of LMOs.139 
To compare the Protocol labeling requirement to the country of 
origin labeling under GATT, it is necessary to return to the three 
scenarios under which the Protocol requires LMO labeling. In the 
first two scenarios, risks related to LMO food products have either 
been found to exist or to presumptively exist due to a lack of 
sufficient probative information. Under these circumstances the 
product label permits an individual consumer to make purchasing 
decisions based on individual considerations of product risks. LMO 
labeling thus allows consumers to make choices based on the quality, 
including the safety, of available products. The country of origin 
labeling permitted by GATT, however, bears no relation to the 
quality of the product. It merely provides domestic consumers with a 
basis for discriminating against out of state products.140 In sum, the 
 
United States to substantiate an unqualified ‘Made in USA’ claim.” Id. In May 1997, the FTC 
issued Proposed Guides for the Use of U.S. Origin Claims, under which a marketer could make 
an unqualified U.S. origin claim if there was a reasonable basis substantiating that the product 
was substantially all made in the United States. Request for Public Comment on Proposed 
Guide for the Use of U.S. Origin Claims, 62 Fed. Reg. 25,020 (May 7, 1997). The Proposed 
Guides also included two “safe harbors” under which an unqualified U.S. origin claim would 
not be considered deceptive. Id. The FTC received 1,057 comments representing 1,165 
commenters, including 963 individual commenters, 24 members of Congress, and two 
consumer organizations. Id. at 63,757. The consumer commenters 
overwhelmingly opposed the Proposed Guides and generally supported an “all or 
virtually all” standard or advocated a specific percentage, usually 90% or, more often, 
100%. Many commenters stated that “‘Made in USA’ means what it says” or 
expressed similar sentiments. Several commenters asserted that changing the current 
standard would confuse consumers wishing to buy American products, leaving them 
unable to determine whether a product was truly made in the United States.  
 Individual consumers also stated that they buy American products to support fellow 
Americans and expressed concern that lowering the standard would lead to a loss in 
American jobs.  
Id. at 63,758. 
 138. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (1994):  
[E]very article of foreign origin . . . imported into the United States shall be marked in 
a conspicuous place as legibly, indelibly, and permanently as the nature of the article 
. . . will permit in such manner as to indicate to an ultimate purchaser in the United 
States . . . the country of origin of the article. 
 139. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 140. Compare Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, in which the 
Supreme Court held that North Carolina violated the requirements of the dormant commerce 
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Protocol’s labeling requirement in these two circumstances is more 
defensible than the labeling permitted by GATT. 
Under the third scenario, the Protocol’s labeling requirement does 
not fare as well. In this situation the state has concluded that the 
LMO food products do not pose a risk. The label, although factually 
true, is likely to have the effect of prompting a product choice that is 
unrelated to the quality of the product, because although the LMO is 
safe, consumers could still avoid any product that bears an LMO 
label. In this context, the Protocol’s required label interacts with the 
attitudes of the purchaser in ways that are similar to the country of 
origin labels, which also have no relation to the quality of the 
product. The Protocol’s labeling requirement in this context is 
defensible only on the ground that it appears no worse than country 
of origin labeling.141 
In sum, the labeling requirement adopted by the Protocol, while 
flawed, is defensible under some circumstances. It does, however, 
appear to apply too broadly and may, for that reason, be inconsistent 
with the international trade regime. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Protocol establishes a two pronged approach regarding the 
international trade of genetically modified agricultural products. With 
 
clause when it imposed a statutory bar against the labeling of Washington state apples regarding 
their origin and state rating. 
[T]he statute has the effect of stripping away from the Washington apple industry the 
competitive and economic advantages it has earned for itself through its expensive 
inspection and grading system. The record demonstrates that the Washington apple-
grading system has gained nationwide acceptance in the apple trade. Indeed, it 
contains numerous affidavits from apple brokers and dealers located both inside and 
outside of North Carolina who state their preference, and that of their customers, for 
apples graded under the Washington, as opposed to the USDA system because of the 
former’s greater consistency, its emphasis on color, and its supporting mandatory 
inspections. Once again, the statute had no similar impact on the North Carolina apple 
industry and thus operated to its benefit. 
432 U.S. 333, 351 (1977). 
 141. Indeed, the Protocol requirement may not be as bad as country of origin labeling 
because the nondiscrimination principle would require that domestic LMO food products also 
bear the required label. In this manner, there would not be discrimination against imported 
products, only discrimination against all LMO food products. 
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respect to the AIA regime for products that are released into the 
environment, the Protocol properly requires the providing of 
information to importing states. The Protocol creates strong 
incentives for the development of adequate scientific information to 
form the basis for risk management decisions.  
Regarding the labeling required for LMOs intended as food 
products, the Protocol’s regime is more problematic. Its requirement 
is overinclusive in some respects and underinclusive in others. 
Underinclusiveness results from the fact that, when residual risks are 
present as a result of the decision to allow imports, the required label 
states only that the product “may contain,” rather than “does 
contain,” genetically modified materials. Overinclusiveness results 
from the fact that the label requirement hypothetically applies even 
when the importing nation has allowed the import of genetically 
modified food products based on a conclusion that the product poses 
no risks. It may be most sensible to view the Protocol’s regulatory 
regime as providing a transitional rule until a firmer basis for risk 
management decisions develops through better scientific studies.142  
 
 142. This assessment of the modest accomplishment that the Protocol represents is 
consistent with the views of other commentators. See Jacob, supra note 46, at 89. Cf. 
McCaffrey, supra note 7, at 102: 
We know there are potential problems; we need more knowledge; we should proceed 
cautiously; we should develop a tighter regulatory scheme; international trade law 
should, and apparently does, permit countries to exclude GM food as to which they 
can make a prima facie showing that it may be dangerous. Let us hope that commercial 
considerations do not blind us to a proper, far-sighted approach to managing the risks 
associated with biotechnology. 
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